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Abstract: Assuming that all animals are sentient would mean ending their use in most scientific
research. This does not necessarily imply an unscientific or anti-scientific stance. Examining the
social role of science reveals its considerable investment in preserving the status quo, including
the continued use of animal subjects. From this perspective, the use of animal subjects is a custom
that science could move beyond, rather than a methodological requirement that it must defend.
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Jonathan Birch (2017) has taken up the task of clarifying the evidence of sentience required to
provide an animal basic protection from harm. This is a valuable task. I found his paper carefully
reasoned and thought-provoking. I am honored to join the list of scholars in conversation about
his work.
One way around the need to set an evidential bar would be to assume that all animals are
sentient, unless proven otherwise. Birch presents this option in section 2 of his target article.
Arthur Reber (2016) has already supported this in his commentary, using his Cellular Basis of
Consciousness model (2016). Birch deems this option “extreme” because “it would invite the
charge of being unscientific or anti-scientific.” It would make research on animal sentience
unnecessary and irrelevant. Moreover, because it would rule out the use of even fruit flies and
nematodes, common models in bioscience, it would create “significant practical obstacles to
biomedical research.” I’m reminded of the scene in the original “Ghostbusters,” where Bill Murray
famously said, “Back off, man. I’m a scientist.”
From this, I conclude that the freedom to harm animals must be preserved so that
scientists can find out how much harm animals can take. Moreover, we need to continue harming
even the smallest of animals in the interest of “science.”
I am neither a biologist nor a philosopher. Rather, I am a sociologist, trained to question
the social role of science, the nature of expertise, and the conditions under which knowledge is
produced. Science’s main interest is self-preservation and protecting itself against threats to
authority. Concerns about being “anti-scientific” make sense only in contrast to a view of science
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as objective and rational, and of scientists as neutral and autonomous. In light of the vast science
studies literature, I very much doubt that Birch believes this propaganda, but his model depends
on an acceptance of Kuhnian “normal scientific standards.”
Against the view of objectivity and neutrality, science’s ties to commercial interests have
made truly independent research very nearly impossible. In academia and government, the
autonomy scientists traditionally enjoyed “has been steadily eroded by the short-term, profitdriven interests of corporations” (Marshall & Picou 2008, p. 244). Because profits require an
unending stream of “needs,” any objections to the use of animals must compete with tales of
human suffering, for which more research — on animals — is necessary. In the service of
corporate imperatives, anything that can be done to animals will be done to them.
Research indicates that animal researchers seek to preserve the ability to conduct
research on animals. For example, a 2012 analysis of animal research ethics committees (IACUCs)
at the 25 top American institutions receiving funding from the National Institutes of Health found
the committees populated mostly by animal researchers, laboratory veterinarians, and others
with a vested interest in continuing animal experiments (Hansen, Goodman, & Chandna 2012).
The imbalance both contributes to “previously-documented committee biases in favor of
approving animal experiments” and weakens “input from the few members representing animal
welfare and the interests of the general public.” Science protects its own.
The “normal scientific standards” and statistical significance that Birch recommends did
not reassure me at all. Phrenology, bloodletting, mercury therapy: the list of harmful claims and
grotesque procedures that once met “normal scientific standards” knows no end. Where pain is
concerned, these standards justified performing open-heart surgery on newborn human infants
without anesthesia until the 1980s (Segner 2016). After all, there was no reliable evidence that
babies could feel pain, and even if they did, they would not remember it. Moreover, while
statistically significant evidence of the presence of an indicator of sentience sounds like an
acceptable standard, the academic and popular literatures have documented the pitfalls of
significance testing. The common practice known as p-hacking, where a researcher obtains
significance by omitting data or running endless tests, has created what some call a crisis of
reproducibility, that bedrock of scientific method (Head et al. 2015).
I support the spirit of Birch’s approach, but I want to think beyond what science “needs.”
Rather, I want science to think beyond what it customarily needs, which is an endless supply of
other animals. Let’s make the third of the 3Rs mean replace animals, not just replace them with
“lower” animals. If this comes across as anti-science, I’ll clarify that there is a difference between
hostility to science and questioning science’s social role. It is possible to appreciate the value of
science while keeping a critical eye on its conduct and values.
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